



Costruire la resilienza delle Infrastrutture Critiche transfrontaliere Learn global to act local

Convegno internazionale del progetto SICt Giovedì 1 e venerdì 2 ottobre 2020







Resilience of Cross-Border Critical Infrastructure

Boris Petrenj

Politecnico di Milano School of Management



















SICt – Resilience of Cross-Border Critical Infrastructures

Regione

ombardia

Cooperation program Interreg V-A Italy-Switzerland

Budget: 1,440,744 € (Italian) + 551,184 CHF (Swiss)

SICt – Sicurezza delle Infrastrutture Critiche transfrontaliere

Partners:

Lombardy Region (Italian leader)

- GD Civil Protection
- GD ICT

Politecnico di Milano

- Mobility and Transport Laboratory
- Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering

Polizia Cantonale Ticinese (Swiss leader)

SUPSI - Scuola Universitaria Professionale della Svizzera Italiana

Cantone Ticino Dipartimento del Territorio

Technical partners: Lombardia Informatica S.p.A, Lombardi SA

Duration: 21 December 2018 - 20 December 2021 (36 months)





Scuola universitaria professionale della Svizzera italiana

SUPSI

Repubblica e Cantone Ticino





SICt – Resilience of Cross-Border Critical Infrastructures

- Strengthening the joint resilience capacities between Italy (Lombardy Region) and Switzerland (Canton Ticino) linked to events that may disrupt the continuity of critical transport infrastructures service with cross-border relevance
- Establishing a collaborative alerting and response to disruption events, by means of new coordinated plans for critical scenarios and a dedicated information-sharing platform







Analysis phase







Area definition & Mapping of nodes

322 Transportation nodes in Italy

- 3 Airports
- 58 Highways and Beltways
- 94 National/Principal Roads
- 48 Provincial/Secondary Roads
- 6 City Roads
- 72 Railway segments
- 10 Stations
- 24 Metro segments
- 7 Metro depots

10 Customs

122 Transportation nodes in Switzerland

- 32 Highways and Tangentials
- 14 National/Principal Roads
- 26 Provincial/Secondary roads
- 30 Railway segments





Dynamic Functional Modelling of Vulnerability and Interdependencies of CIs (DMCI)

- Vulnerable nodes susceptible to threats which can affect the node functionality (the service they provide);
- Threats that cause missed service demand (MSD) in vulnerable nodes
- Functional and logical interdependencies between vulnerable nodes
- Propagation of inoperability (disruption of node service due to cascading effects) and demand variations throughout the nodes of the same infrastructure and between interdependent CI

Developed by POLIMI, to understand how disruptive events on CIs could spread to the whole network due to different types of interdependencies







DMCI Modelling Approach







Data collection through collaboration with the operators

The PPC in Lombardy involves operators in the transportation sector

- Railways
- Metro lines
- Airports
- Highways
- National and regional road networks

autostrade



per l'italia

4ZIENDA TRASPORTI MILANESI S.p.A



milanoserravalle

milanotangenziali





The Swiss partners are working closely with the operators in the region on the data collection



Schweizerische Eidgenossensch Confédération suisse Confederazione Svizzera Confederaziun svizra

Swiss Confederation

Bundesamt für Strassen ASTRA Office fédéral des routes OFROU Ufficio federale delle strade USTRA Uffizi federal da vias UVIAS Federal Roads Office FEDRO



Data: Infrastructure type, name, geo-localisation, physical and functional characteristics, interdipendencies with other nodes and other infrastructures (es. energy, telecommunications), service type and capacity, standard service demand (including seasonality)...





Vital Node Analysis (VNA)



Critical nodes have the property to influence and degrade the service capacity of other nodes and the infrastructure system as a whole



Sensible nodes are susceptible to being disrupted by disturbances of other nodes in the system. They are dependent on the functionality of other nodes

VNA is conducted through simulation campaigns in which each experiment assumes the total loss of functional integrity of one of the mapped nodes







Integrated risk analysis

- Risk exposure of individual infrastructure nodes
- Node vulnerability to such events
- Probabilities for specific hazards and threats









DMCI implementation in the JRC GRRASP

GRRASP is a Web-oriented architecture developed by JRC (Ispra), bringing together geospatial technologies and computational tools for the analysis and simulation of CI

GRRASP-enabled enhancements

- Modular structure
- Web GUI, GIS integration
- Simplified data collection (all in single place)
- Combining other Risk Analysis tools

GEOSPATIAL RISK AND RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT PLATFORM (GRRASP)

♠ Dashboard Content Struct C GR ² AS	ure SP	Appearance	People Modules Configuration Reports Help
GR'ASP Geospatia	I R	sk and Re	silience Assessment Platform
Home browse layers may	p	draw layers	grrasp_models_cinopsys grrasp_models_networkmetrics grrasp_models_dmci
Dock			View Edit
Select a base layer.			+ origina team team outsiderer 2
OpenStreetMaps		•	
railway_stations			E berge 2 Braver of the Braver
imported_network_example_NC		Ē	te and the second design of th
Milano_Nelson	V	E	
network_edges			There is a second and the second and
network_nodes	m	F -	

https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/grrasp





Critical Scenarios

Involving transportation nodes in the border area whose disruption would cause a significant impact (MSD) on both sides (i.e. both countries), and might benefit the most from coordinated cross-border emergency management

Scenario 1 – Heavy Snowfall in the area around highway A36 connecting Como (IT)

and Lugano (CH)



Scenario 2 – Train derailment on the rail line Varese – Luino – Bellinzona







Scenario Analysis and Collaborative Response Strategy

- Simulations of selected scenarios of interest
 - Evaluation of possible protection and resilience strategies by varying simulation parameters
- Intensive work with the regional stakeholders
 - to understand organisational arrangements and emergency procedures
 - to map existing information flows and find gaps
 - to understand the factors which would require a collaborative (cross-border) response
 - to indetify ways in which to improve the use and management of available resources
 - to collect requirements for the IT platform (PIC) which will support the collaborative activities







Main expected outcomes

1) Shared rules (Agreements, Guidelines, documents) valid at cross-border level to harmonize the organizational and operational emergency response models

2) A fixed and mobile monitoring network for critical crossborder infrastructures

3) An IT platform for an effective monitoring, information sharing and operational coordination in critical situations









Integrated platform - PIC



THANK YOU









